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The relevance of medical ethics to daily practice should be obvious to all doctors,
but the relationship between 'ethics and practice' raises many complex moral
issues. 'Medical ethics is not a new subject, but a vital aspect of all medical
practice, the implications of which must be made explicit throughout medical
education'.' The key word is 'explicit', because morality is a serious and abstract
topic, even in medicine. Some doctors recoil from it, because of the jargon
associated with it. Samuel Butler once said 'The foundations of morality are like
other foundations; if you dig too much about them the superstructure will come
tumbling down'. I will try therefore to be both explicit and short-lived, and will not
dig too deeply into the moral foundations, just enough to prepare students and
young doctors for moral decision-making.
The question may be asked sometimes, who should we blame but ourselves if we
take wrong moral options? We should all like to shift the blame by shouting at
and accusing someone else. That is not a feasible solution. My contribution is to
try and express effectively an acceptable and practical framework of ethical
principles which could provide a basis of moral reasoning in medical practice. The
recently published report of an Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the
teaching of medical ethics in British medical schools has found many deficiencies
and made new recommendations for change.
Professional attitudes are often determined by ethical principles and moral
values, which determine in our minds and conscience whether our actions are
considered to be morally right or wrong.2 By medical ethics I do not mean
standards of professional competence or conduct, but rather as Dunstan has
defined 'the obligations of a moral nature which govern the practice of medicine'.
The words 'ethics' and 'morals' are used interchangeably.
Philosophy is firstly about the critical evaluation of assumptions and arguments,
and secondly about the clarification of concepts being evaluated. Naturally,
I hesitate before plunging into the deep waters of philosophy and moral
philosophy, not being properly trained to do so. In all its aspects, philosophy is a
peculiar and at times ambiguous activity, which means different things to
different people at different times and places. Doctors understandably do not
take kindly to spending valuable time in abstract debate about the meaning and
function of words and phrases. Yet it is necessary to do so, as rationality is
common to science and philosophy. By definition moral philosophy is concerned
with the critical study of morality. It examines the basic principles, norms and
values which underlie moral judgements. Raphael believes that it is not practical
in any real sense.3 It cannot and does not tell us what we should do. We must
decide that for ourselves. His advice is 'Do not expect moral philosophy to solve
The Ulster Medical Society, 1987.
W G Irwin, MD,-FRCGP, Professor of General Practice, The Queen's University of Belfast,
Duniuce Health Centre, 1 Dunluce Avenue, Belfast BT9 7HR.The Ulster Medical Journal
the practical problem of life or to be a crutch on which you can lean'. This might
appear at first glance to be contrary to my hypothesis, but moral philosophy
cannot exist in a vacuum. It must examine real life problems and in this context be
used to assist doctors both to be effective clinically and to take correct moral
options.
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND CODES OF BEHAVIOUR
In order better to understand the application of moral reasoning to practical
issues, I start with a summary of general ethical principles, doctrines and specific
codes of behaviour, which teaching experience has shown to be essential
learning, before proceeding to consider case examples. The Hippocratic Oath
was probably written in the 5th century B.C. A doctor who takes the Oath swears
above all to try to benefit his patient and especially not to harm him or her. He
also swears never to divulge what he sees or hears in the course of his profession.
The Declaration of Geneva is the modern restatement of the oath drawn up in
1947 by the World Medical Association and amended in 1973 and 1983.4 Other
specific codes of ethics soon followed which are listed and described in the BMA
Handbook ofmedical ethics: Sydney in 1968 defined the criteria of brain death;
Oslo in 1970 discussed the criteria for therapeutic abortion; Tokyo in 1975
adopted guidelines for doctors concerned with torture and punishment; and
Lisbon in 1981 discussed patient rights and confidentiality. All these codes
provide abundant guidelineson specific issues, but they do not resolve adequately
the conflict between the claims of the individual and the wider requirements of
society.
The general principles so important in applied ethics are as follows:-
1. Beneficence. One should do good to the patient. This needs to be tempered
by the next principle.
2. Non-maleficence (Primum non nocere). Above all, one should do no harm.
This is more stringently enforced than the first principle.
3. Respectforthe authority ofthepatient. A patientshould be freeto determine
his own actions and give consent to the treatment offered. Essentially
autonomy is the capacity of the patient to think, decide and act on the basis
of such thought and decision, freely and independently and without 'let or
hindrance'.5 The duty of beneficence or 'doing good' has to be moderated by
the duty of respect for autonomy.
4. Truth. The principle of telling the truth cannot be regarded as an absolute
moral principle, but it is an ideal to be pursued to enhance trust and
confidence. Ethical principles conflict at times in relation to truth-telling and
it is sometimes necessary to deceive a patient for his own good. Generally
speaking, however, deception conflicts with one's desires to preserve patient
autonomy and a sound healthy relationship.
5. Preservation oflife. Phillips and Dawson6 argue that maintaining respect for
life is not synonymous with preserving life at all costs. The principle oftrying
to preserve life by any means gives rise to many modern dilemmas.
6. Justice. The principle of justice refers to the fair distribution of scarce
resources within society and in its application may conflict with one's
absolute moral principles and duty to individual patients. A true believer in
utilitarianism would argue that resources should be deployed to the most
cost-effective techniques in which benefits are clear in relation to costs. The
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fundamental paradox of health care is that medical advances so often breed
further needs and increase further requirements for care.7 The further life
expectancy is extended, the greater becomes the pressure to allocate more
resources to geriatric services. The ideal of trying to provide health care for
all needs is laudable, but it is impossible for the Exchequer to meet all
demands and some form of rationing of resources is inevitable.
7. Confidentiality. The principle ofconfidentiality between doctor and patient is
venerated in the Hippocratic tradition. The nature of professional confidence
varies according to the form of consultation or examination. The doctor is
responsible to the patient for the security and confidentiality of the inform-
ation given to him. Even after death a doctor must preserve secrecy on all
he knows.
THE MAJOR CATEGORIES OF ETHICAL THEORIES
In America for some years past, persons concerned with ethical matters have
plied their trade in hospitals and medical centres. Have they been doing anything
useful, or what are they supposed to be doing? To answer these questions we
come to examine and discuss the two major types of ethical theories.
Deontological theories of ethics are based on the 'rights and duties' of persons
(deon is the Greek word for duty).9 In this group the consequences of one's
actions are nottaken into account. Much theological dogma common to the great
Christian religions expects absolute obedience to moral rules, for example, the
Ten Commandments. The orthodox religious view is that all human beings are
morally equivalent and have equal natural rights: a right to life, a right not to be
killed, and a moral duty not to kill others. Others do not believe that people
intrinsically possess absolute moral values and have inherent moral rights. These
opposing views conflict in moral judgements of everyday events, so that some-
times what may appear on superficial examination to be utilitarian, may on closer
inspection turn out to be absolutist, and vice versa. The great religions probably
postulate that moral decision-making should often be taken out of the sole hands
of doctors and clear guidelines should be laid down by the State having listened
obediently to the spiritual and moral teaching authority ofthe Church on behalfof
humanity.
The second category of major ethical theory is that of utilitarianism.10 Put in its
simplest Benthamite terms, it is about maximising happiness and pleasure and
minimising misery, pain and suffering as a consequence of action taken. The
theory was subsequently modified in the 19th Century by John Stuart Mill8 to the
moral concept of the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number'. It would be
difficult to persuade people today that a human being's ability to feel pain and
pleasure was the sole fundamental moral criterion by which to judge his actions.
Mill saw the ultimate goal in life as an existence as free as possible from pain and
misery, and as rich as possible in enjoyment, in quality and in quantity.
It is necessary to complete our conceptual framework by mentioning briefly
several more doctrines:
Acts and omissions. A small minority of doctors might advocate voluntary
euthanasia for patients who desired to die to end prolonged suffering. As Arthur
Hugh Clough said, 'Thou shalt not kill, but need'st not strive officiously to keep
alive'. The doctrine of 'acts and omissions' needs to be examined in this context.
Is there a moral difference between the act of killing and a failure to act which
leads subsequently to the death of a patient?
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In 1981, members of Life instigated legal procedures against a Derbyshire
paediatrician, Dr Leonard Arthur, accusing him of the murder of a new-
born infant with Down's Syndrome rejected by his mother. Dr Arthur was
acquitted although he had only prescribed dihydrocodeine and nursing
care to relieve suffering.1' He did not adopt any extraordinary means of
resuscitation to keep the baby alive when it became gravely ill, because
the parents did not wish it. He made a judgement based on clinical and
compassionate grounds. This case posed many moral problems. All
doctors would recoil from actively killing an infant for fear of the moral
outcry and the legal consequences of being accused of infanticide. Many
would, however, support Dr Arthur's actions.
A patient of mine, a man aged 92, who had enjoyed good health for over
90 years, was admitted to hospital with a refusal to eat much food for
several weeks. He developed marked weight loss and became helpless,
bedridden and dependent. Routine radiological and blood investigations
revealed nothing abnormal and hecontinued downhill. It became apparent
that he had lost the will to live and was in a state of terminal depression.
Let us suppose he had a coronary thrombosis in the presence of the ward
consultant, who decided not to intervene with the mobile care unit, and
the patient subsequently died. Was this omission morally acceptable or
should he have striven officiously to keep him alive by resuscitation?
Suppose instead the consultant had sent for the coronary care team and
after some delay the old chap had been kept alive but unconscious on a
mechanical ventilator. Fearing brain damage from anoxia the consultant
orders the machine to be switched off and the patient dies.
Judged by the basic principles enunciated of beneficence and non-maleficence,
the moral consequences of the omission in the first instance, and the commission
in the second case, are the same. In utilitarian moral terms a patient with anoxic
brain damage would not have obtained benefit by being kept alive as a vegetable.
The moral position must, however, be based on more than these considerations.
As Gillon says, 'there is little doubt that both the consequences of an action and
the doctor's beliefs and intentions about what he is doing are relevant to moral
assessment'." The crucial issue underlying the 'acts and omissions' doctrine is
therefore the understanding and intent with which the doctor acted. Had he
withheld treatment in a younger adult, his omission would have been regarded as
morally indefensible. It is generally agreed, however, that it should not be for the
law to decide the criminality of one decision or the other. Clinicians should be free
to take these difficult ethical decisions without becoming defensive and living in
fear of being arrested.
Ordinary and extraordinary means. Linked to the above doctrine is that of
'ordinary and extraordinary means'. Pope Pius XII in 1957 applied this to answer
moral questions about the use of mechanical ventilation in cases of brain death.'2
It was sufficient in serious illness, he said, to use only ordinary means to preserve
life and health. This was obligatory in moral terms. The use of respirators was
classified then as 'extraordinary means' and morally optional depending upon the
special circumstancesofthepatient and the wishesof hisfamily. So 'extraordinary
means' may be defined as treatment which involves a great burden for the patient
and/or next-of-kin. There would be no moral distinction, however, between
ordinary and extraordinary means if it was in the patient's best interests to be kept
alive.
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Double effect. This doctrine is designed by theologians to ease moral decision-
making in situations when intended good effects are likely to be nullified by
unintended but foreseeable bad effects: for example, a doctor may administer
medical treatment which is required to save the life of a pregnant woman even
though this results in the death of the fetus, since the death of the fetus was not
itself sought; a hysterectomy may have to be performed on a pregnant female
who has an advanced cancer of the uterus.
APPLIED ETHICS
It is increasingly recognised that doctors cannot escape making a variety of
ethicaljudgements in their practice. These vary from mundane practice decisions
about accepting or rejecting difficult or unwelcome patients, perhaps unkempt,
bedraggled and socially undesired by all, to issuing certificates against one's
moral principles, to life and death issues. Students still receive insufficient formal
education in ethical reasoning to help them prepare for such predicaments. It is
just hoped and assumed that bedside teaching and scientific training will
somehow equip them to make the right or the most professional decision without
there being any clear idea of what 'right' or 'professional' means in this moral
context.
Terminal careofthe dying patient isan area that illustrates well mutually exclusive
ethical courses of action. It is taught formally in the fourth year of the Queen's
medical curriculum by close collaboration between the Departments of General
Practice, Geriatric Medicine, Mental Health and Oncology, with various health
and social work professionals, ministers of religion, and doctors and nurses from
the Northern Ireland Hospice. Telling the truth gently is more morally complex
than appears at first sight.
We try to make clear to students different and conflicting ethical positions, and
discuss some mutually exclusive principles. These principles come into play in
telling the truth to dying patients and may conflict if applied categorically. Two
cases will illustrate the different moral dilemmas.
A 26-year-old doctor, Campbell Moreland, became ill in 1980 and died of
testicular cancer in 1982. His paper 'Whose choice? Whose consent?'
was published by the Faculty of Medicine and used since for student
reading.13 It gives a poignant account of his illness, treatment and
suffering. His experience shows that some doctors still practise in a
pragmatic way without any sense of moral values. He used denial at the
start of his illness despite a period of extensive investigations and at
various stages in its course even after orchidectomy. At that stage he did
not want to hear a specific diagnosis. He just drifted along in a state of
depression hoping that it would soon be all over. Yet twelve months later
when he was recovering from abdominal radiotherapy he bitterly resented
being told a blatant lie by an unfortunate young doctor that his chestX-ray
was perfectly normal, when he was riddled with lung secondaries and
denial had been cast aside. He knew that he was terminally ill. He was
physically frail, but intellectually active.
Truth-telling in my student days in a similar situation was a matter pf practical
expediency to be avoided at all costs. Deception was the name ofthe game so as
not to damage patient morale or shorten life or indeed offend the consultant in
charge, whose policy of communication in these situations was usually not
known. The young doctor lied in the wrong circumstances and rejected the
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patient's autonomy and right to be informed of all the options and consequences.
Campbell Moreland expresses this vividly: 'So often the doctor confuses his
privileged position in the doctor-patient relationship with what he considers a
right to choose for the patient'. He has no moral right to do so in many instances.
He is simply caught between two conflicting options - that of preserving life and
that of relieving suffering.
Recently I was privileged to receive from a cleric a diary kept by a spouse
in the practice, whose young husband had died. She had known for six
months that the prognosis was hopeless but withheld discussion ofthe fact
because her husband never seemed to consider that he was gravely ill and
battled on bravely to meeting his daily commitments. He discovered the
truth from his doctor only when close to death. He was quite shocked
because he had always expected to recover. She wrote -'He has been ill
many times, had suffered bravely and without complaint, but he had
always recovered'. She was torn with guilt and anguish that she had not
told him sooner, but was afraid that by doing so she would have under-
mined his confidence or shortened his life. The patient had been well
supported in his terminal illness by his wife, his family, the Church, a
cancer specialist and the family doctor. When he was close to death, his
wife asked him if he was very lonely thinking about death and he said he
was. She wrote 'That night my husband had a struggle. He could not
accept death and that the end was close. He said "We'll fight it. The
doctors were not right before". I just held him closely to comfort him'.
Unfortunately, the doctors were right this time and he died soon in a coma.
This case illustrates the anguish for the doctor of balancing deception and truth-
telling in the interests ofthe dying patient, ofinfringing autonomy yet maintaining
confidence and morale. Yet one must walk the tight-rope of honesty to achieve
spiritual contentment and trust and confidence in the doctor-patient relationship
to the very end.
The primary care setting provides a great array of problems which require ethical
decision-making. Prominent among these are problems related to reproduction,
including abortion, birth defects, infertility, contraception, sterilisation and sexual
issues in general, and also pain control and patients' rights.
NATURE OF CONFIDENTIALITY
General practitioners are familiar with the problems confronting a family doctor
who prescribed contraceptives to a 151/2 year-old girl who is having illicit sex with
a mature male. She is determined to continue the relationship, prefers the pill to
alternative methods of birth control and refuses consent to her parents being
informed. In 1980 the DHSS (London), in a Health Service Notice, issued guide-
lines for doctors in this type of case: 'A doctor was entitled in exceptional
circumstances to prescribe contraceptives to a girl under 16 in England and
Wales without the consent of parents'. Many people maintained that the circular
encouraged or condoned unlawful intercourse. Mrs Victoria Gillick challenged the
DHSS guidance in the courts on the grounds that the notice made doctors
accessories to a crime and infringed the rights of parents over their children. In
court the judge upheld the DHSS guidelines provided the doctor thought the girl
competent and mature enough to understand all the issues involved. Mrs Gillick
then contested thisjudgement in the Court ofAppeal and in 1984 herappeal was
allowed. The Court held that the ethical position in law was that parents are the
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best arbiters of the child's interests and ignored patient autonomy. The see-saw
legal battle continued and the Law Lords in 1985 upheld the DHSS appeal
against the Gillick judgement and reversed the Court of Appeal's ruling.
The Law Lords defined the five exceptional circumstances under which a doctor
could prescribe contraceptives to a girl under age as: (1) the girl understands;
(2) she cannot be persuaded to tell her parents; (3) she is likely to begin or
continue sexual intercourse with or without contraceptive treatment; (4) unless
she receives treatment her health will suffer, and (5) her best interests require
treatment without parental knowledge.
The ethical implications of all this for doctors are three-fold. The BMA maintains
the principle of confidentiality to be paramount, but opponents claim that secrecy
has no intrinsic moral value and would argue that it was more immoral to maintain
the girl's confidence and deceive her parents. Gillick supporters argue that
hormones are dangerous drugs and the supply of contraceptives infringes the
principle of non-maleficence, is liable to harm the health of the patient, and
encourages early promiscuity. Thirdly, under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 if a
man has intercourse with a girl under 16 (England and Wales) he is criminally
liable. Some may feel that a doctor would be acting immorally to collude in
prescribing contraceptives, thereby transgressing the moral law of God and the
law of society. Professor Kennedy14 states that the doctor could be regarded in
law as an accessory to crime only if he prescribed contraceptives in collusion with
the male partner to encourage the under-age girl to have sexual intercourse.
In 1986 the last DHSS Guidelines were issued spelling out 'exceptionally, in cases
where persuasion to tell the parents fails, the doctor should be free to prescribe
without parental knowledge'. There the matter rests for the time being, but let
me remind you of the BMA's five exceptions to the principle of not breaching
confidentiality (BMA Handbook ofmedical ethics) :4 (1) when the patient gives
consent; (2) when it is undesirable on medical grounds to seek a patient's
consent, but it is in the patient's own interest that confidentiality should be
broken; (3) when the doctor's duty to society overrides the principle; (4) when
required for the purposes of medical research; (5) when required by due legal
process. Secrecy is ultimately destructive of honesty and trust. Yet if the GP had
informed the girl's parents without her consent, there would have been a family
crisis. It is sometimes well-nigh impossible to choose a course of action which
meets the teenager's health needs and at the same time does not violate the
doctor's honest relationship with her parents. Underlying the Gillick arguments is
the question ofwho should decide for the young. Lord Scarman revealed that the
decision to override parental rights and responsibilities was not entirely a question
of a doctor's discretion. He warned that a doctor must exercise his judgement
properly, otherwise there could be possible criminal consequences, if he went
outside the exceptional circumstances already defined by the Law Lords. Parents
should normally decide, but how can they exercise this responsibility ifthey are in
a state of ignorance of their child's sexual behaviour. In these circumstances it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that a doctor who knows the parents is the person
to exercise this responsibility, because he is the one to whom the girl has gone for
medical advice.
THE SELECTIVE TREATMENT OF BIRTH DEFECTS
Early in my career in the Jubilee Neonatal Unit I was confronted with the ethical
problems posed by the treatment of severely malformed infants with spina bifida
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and hydrocephalus. Many can be saved now from death by surgical treatment.
Modern surgical advances and medical technology have brought great benefits
but have blurred concepts of life and death and created huge ethical dilemmasfor
doctors. Lorber, a Sheffield paediatrician, assessed the results of early surgical
treatment of spina bifida in babies ten years ago and identified the sharp ethical
problems in management.15 He chose babies with 'initial adverse criteria' after
careful research and follow-up and put them into the 'non-treatment category'.
This meant selecting some babies early on for nursing and medical care only - in
other words, they would be kept clean and comfortable, and fed only on demand,
but no measures would be taken to prolong their lives, such as restoration offluid
balance. He was supported in this ethical policy by the recommendations of a
Working Party under the auspices of the Newcastle Regional Hospital Board,
which laid down clear guidelines for doctors to follow in the selective treatment of
spina bifida in infants.'6 Many would still argue that this policy is not moral.
Lorber, however, makes it clear that he is against infanticide or active euthanasia,
which he regards as both brutalising and illegal. He argues that less than halfofall
babies born in Britain with spina bifida survive to three years of age. In fact the
less severely affected survive and most of the others die, often after many
operations and much discomfort. Thus his severely affected babies, selected for
non-treatment, would even if operated on have a very high mortality.17 Medical
dominance in decision-making is being challenged by society, but many
paediatricians plead for doctors to be allowed to retain primary decisional power
even if the chosen course of action involves the death of the infant.'8
Lorber's selective treatment includes an assessment of the severity of the
abnormality, of the likely effects of this upon the future quality of life ofthe infant
after surgery, and ofthe likely burdens upon family and society. He arguesfurther
in justification of his utilitarian moral stance that survival of severely affected
babies may disrupt family life, cause mental breakdown, suicide and even family
break-up in some instances. Ranged against him, however, are the moral
arguments of many philosophers and theologians. Harris, a philosopher, sees
selective treatment as morally indefensible and in his view no differentfrom active
euthanasia. 19 The right to life ofseverely handicapped newborn infants should be
accepted without question. Gillon believes, however, 'that it is because the newly-
born infant is not a person, that it isjustifiable in cases of severe handicap to allow
it to die'.20 Thus we see the conflict of moral views even amongst those
concerned about ethical matters. In law the distinction that exists in medical
practice between active and passive euthanasia is also recognised. The doctor
who brings about the death of his patient by some positive slip is guilty of murder.
In the case of the severely malformed infant, the doctor who withholds treatment
is criminally liable only if there was a duty to provide treatment. If the child was
likely to die in natural circumstances the law would regard treatment as merely
postponing death. Cases on the quality of life have not to my knowledge come
before the courts, and in the absence of legislation doctors and patients are still
left to make these difficult ethical decisions about life and death in the treatment
of severely handicapped infants.2'
INFERTILITY AND FERTILISATION
There are serious moral problems raised by the 'reproduction revolution' brought
about by the use of in-vitro fertilisation techniques. Soon in Belfast 'GIFT'
techniques will be in use to overcome unexplained infertility in women with
patent fallopian tubes. Gamete Intra Fallopian Transfer, which introduces sperms
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and ova into the tubes, poses fewer moral problems than in-vitro fertilisation
or implantation of a fertilised embryo into the uterus. In respect of the latter,
for the moral purposes of this lecture I will stick to the Warnock Report
recommendations.22
The birth of Louise Brown at Oldham in 1978 following IVF techniques to
overcome the mother's infertility heralded a new era in the treatment of the
disorder, which causes great psychological dysfunction, but rarely suicide. The
success rate of IVF remains disappointingly low.23 Replacing three or four
embryos in the uterus offers the best chance of success, about a 25 per cent
chance of pregnancy and a 14 per cent acceptable multiple pregnancy rate. It is
also regrettable that only one of the 25 British IVF centres is operated under the
NHS, the rest being privately managed. Experimentation over the past 10 years
has brought into existence many left-over embryos, called 'spare embryos'.
Speaking euphemistically they have died by the process of being washed down
the sink. The temptation to do some form of research on these has proved
irresistible to the scientists. The genetic material of the nucleus can be replicated
into an infinite number of clones. Professor Ian Donald of Glasgow thinks such
breeding to specification 'is indeed a threat to human life': what he calls 'a sort of
scientific cannibalism'.24 The only possible moraljustification has to be expressed
in utilitarian terms -the greatest good for the greatest number from the research.
Yet it is virtually impossible to separate in moral terms issues of experimentation
from therapeutic techniques of IVF because they are inter-dependent. Critics of
the Warnock recommendations in this respect point to the lack of Christian
judgement and the lack of emphasis on moral and spiritual aspects of the
situation.24, 25 There is some truth in this criticism because secular society was
considered and a majority of members favoured a utilitarian position. They were
undoubtedly deeply influenced by the potential benefits to mankind from
research on human embryos. These range from enhanced knowledge of the
process of conception, and of male infertility, to the genetic diagnosis of the
embryos, to providing spare parts for a recipient of organ transplants in order to
minimise the chances of tissue rejection. They seemingly elevated the advances
of infertility treatment above concern for the welfare of human embryos.
A compromise was adopted that embryo experimentation should be accepted
up to 14 days after fertilisation only under licence, and unauthorised use would
constitute a criminal offence. The cut-off point at 14 days is arbitrary in moral
terms because, as Cameron says, 'if sentience, the ability to feel pain, is
ultimately to be the criterion it is something which is readily capable ofsubjection
to anaesthesia'.25 This view, stressing the point in embryonic brain development,
when the embryo becomes a 'human person', is rejected in moral terms by
Christian theologians, although it must be taken seriously.
Society must lay down some new ground rules to deal with the new technology
and its consequences for mankind. Gillon poses the moral question 'What do we
mean by the term human being?'26 This is relevant to all the major moral issues
of life today including abortion and switching off life-support machines. This
raises further questions: 'When does life begin?' and 'Is the embryo a person?'.
Orthodox Christian theology teaches that the zygote, the fusion of sperm and
egg, is a human being equipped with a unique genetic package. Holbrook
maintains that our respect for the human embryo must be absolute and must not
be qualified by consideration ofthe benefits for research.27 Cameron believes that
'our definition of what is distinctly human must be broad enough to encompass
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the product of conception from its earliest days'.25 Tomlin argues that human
embryo experimentation is a blatant violation of the Kantian principle that 'one
should never treat a human being as a means to an end, but always as an end
in itself'.28 My understanding of Roman Catholic theology from the evidence
presented to the Inquiry was that people are special, because human beings
possess a soul from the time of 'ensoulment' at conception. Unfortunately, there
is still disagreement in Christian circles as to when precisely this occurs29 and this
was reflected in the oral evidence received. The problem in the Inquiry was that
no moral consensus could be found, which reflects all the views of society itself.
A narrow majority held that the fundamental moral questions (about life itself,
already mentioned), were not susceptible of straightforward simple answers.
Warnock says 'the answers to such questions are complex amalgams of factual
and moral judgements'.22
Having tiptoed through the tulips of the Warnock minefield, where does this leave
the busy doctor? First, it has to be understood that experimentation on human
embryos is something which has already happened and has resulted in IVF
techniques being used to produce hundreds of babies. A recent Edinburgh
survey of attitudes of women of reproductive age to IVF procedures and embryo
research showed that 94% thought that IVF treatment should be definitely
allowed in Britain and much the same proportion wanted it available and free on
the NHS.30 This may mean that Britain is more a secular than a Christian society,
but clearly each doctor must follow his conscience in the matter; regardless of
personal morals he must seek to make specialised advice in this field available to
any female patient seeking a remedy for childlessness when the new techniques
are appropriate. This causes great moral embarrassment to some young doctors
who argue that by doing so they are in fact colluding in murder - the same, of
course, applies to therapeutic abortion. Personal moral values have to be weighed
against values of human compassion and contractual responsibilities to one's
patient.
TEACHING MEDICAL ETHICS
Gillon's intensive survey of the teaching of medical ethics in the USA revealed
much more formal pre-clinical teaching than in Britain. Informal ethics teaching
takes place as in the British Isles at the bedside in the clinical years. There is
general agreement that theory and practice should be integrated as early as
possible.31 My own survey of medical ethics teaching in the UK showed that
medical deans could not quantify or comment on the quality of the teaching.
A successful prototype course was first run by Len Doyal, a lecturer in philsophy,
at University College, London, in 1985/86. It was the first of its kind developed
in response to the 1980 GMC recommendations with regard to medical ethics
teaching.32 The format of each session is a short lecture or film followed by a large
group discussion with 45 students. The course has been revised in 1986/87 to
contain the following topics: moral reasoning and medical ethics; the rights and
duties of doctors; morality and scarce health service resources; morality and
paediatrics; the ethics of medical experimentation; a return to personal autonomy
and individual rights; the ethics of prevention versus care; medicine, morality and
under-development; medical ethics and education. Some of these issues are
covered in our embryo 4th year ethics teaching sessions at Queen's and we use
clinical situations to explore many more moral issues.
Baroness Mary Warnock believes that teaching of moral reasoning should take
place in schools before entry to universities. This is not universal here and is
© The Ulster Medical Society, 1987.
10Medical ethics 1 1
unlikely to become so. By the time students reach medical school, their moral
character has been formed. We can, however, provide them with ethical
knowledge and interpersonal skills to enhance their ethical behaviour. Further-
more, we must bring home to them the practical importance of ethical issues for
the wholeofsociety. Weshould encourage them to come totheirown conclusions
and help them to resolve conflict. Simple health economics must be taught,
especially about the just distribution of scarce health service resources.
The time has come to make recommendations about the teaching of the topic in
the future. My thoughts are best summarised in two recommendations of a
Working Party of the Institute of Medical Ethics,' a group convened by the
General Medical Council and the Nuffield Foundation.
1. Medical ethics teaching should recur at regular intervals throughout medical
training, and time should be set aside within existing teaching for ethical
reflection relevant to each stage of the student's experience.
2. Clinical teaching of medical ethics should normally begin from clinical
examples. Such teaching should be exploratory and analytical rather than
hortatory. Adequate provision should be made for small group discussions.
Discussions should be supported by critical reading of relevant papers on
medical ethics.
No one could gainsay either of these recommendations. They are met, albeit to a
limited extent, in present formal teaching of medical ethics in the 4th year Joint
Course in the Queen's medical curriculum. We seem to have got the format right
and we have interested teachers. From time to time it may prove necessary to
involve moral philosophers and representatives of the legal profession, much as
we have done with spiritual advisers in care of the dying.
In conclusion, I have made explicit the relevance of medical ethics to clinical
practice and offered a practical method of applying general ethical principles and
moral doctrines to solve medical moral dilemmas. Your reaction and response will
settle whether or not I was wise to choose such an abstract yet important topic in
the wake of the I.M.E. Report. I found it a daunting task, conscious that doctors
do not like theoretical lectures on moral philosophy. I will blame the choice on the
vagaries of a professor of general practice, a peculiar hybrid by any standards.
Universities and general practice are very different in structure and function. The
former are intellectual and increasingly research-orientated, the latter is more
intuitive and pragmatic. If I have managed to overcome to some degree the
difficulties of my academic post it is in no small measure due to the enormous
support of my colleagues in hospital and general practice, and the staff in the
Department itself. Medical ethics is a vital aspect of medical practice. To
summarise the theme of this address I quote Longfellow, 'Morality without
religion is an empty shell, a kind of dead reckoning, an endeavour to find our
place on a cloudy sea'.
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